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AILOR v. CITY OF MAYNARD VILLE, TENNESSEE:
WHAT CONSTITUTES COMPLIANCE UNDER
THE CLEAN WATER ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
More than sixty percent of all major facilities in the United
States, including manufacturing, electronic, wastewater treatment
and sewage plants, exceeded their Clean Water Act (CWA) permit
limits on discharges into waterways at least once between January 1,
2002 and June 30, 2003.1 In addition, a new study has confirmed
that states lack money to fund the regulation of the CWA.2 Over
the past ten years, water pollution has increased and private citizens
affected by the pollution have fewer remedies. 3 Reports have con-
cluded that polluters often escape with merely the threat of punish-
ment for violating the CWA, which is attributable to the insufficient
tools available for state enforcement officials. 4 Compounding the
problem, in 2003 the number of Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) enforcement officials and the number of inspection staff
members fell to its lowest point since the establishment of the
1. See Juliet Eilperin, EPA Faulted on Clean-Water Violations; Consumer Interest
Group's Study Details Lax Enforcement at Major Facilities, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at
A-8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&
contentd=A37356-2004Mar30&notFound=try (describing study indicating num-
ber of states exceeding NPDES limits). As a result of the study, the U.S. Public
Research Interest Group concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is failing to act against violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) committed
by U.S. plants and factories. Id.
2. See Don Thompson, Study: States Too Under-funded to Prevent Water Pollution,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.greatlakesdirectory.org/mn/101104
-greatilakes.htm (indicating that states lack funds necessary to enforce CWA).
Mr. Clifford Rechtschaffen, director of San Francisco's Golden Gate University's
environmental law program and co-director of its Environmental Law and Justice
Clinic, conducted a study and found that the majority of the seventeen states he
surveyed lacked the funding to provide sufficient regulation under the CWA. Id.
Specifically, Rechtschaffen studied seventeen states' enforcement of the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, New
Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
3. See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, Sewage Pollution Threatens Public Health: Ag-
ing sewer systems and rollbacks of environmental law are compounding the problem, Dec. 9,
2004, http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/sewage.asp (determining that sewage
overflows create environmental and public health crisis).
4. See INDIANA STUDENT PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, Colorado Among
Worst States on Regulation of Air and Water Polluters: Lax Enforcement Cited, Oct. 23,
2002, http://www.inpirg.org/incampus.asp?id2=9048 (describing lack of penalties
for polluters).
(285)
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agency.5 Recognizing that a limited number of governmental re-
sources existed to accomplish its goal of keeping the nation's waters
clean, Congress enacted a citizen suit provision under the CWA to
encourage citizens to assist in the enforcement of environmental
laws. 6
This Note discusses the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding
in Ailor v. City of Maynardville, Tennesee,7 which concluded that a citi-
zen suit under the CWA was precluded because the citizens did not
file their suit until several weeks after the defendant's last recorded
violation. 8 Part II of this Note sets forth the facts in Ailor.9 Part III
explains the background of the CWA and the purpose of citizen
suits under the CWA. 10 In addition, Part III explores the Supreme
Court's decisions and the Sixth Circuit's decisions regarding citizen
suits and the CWA. 11 Part IV critically analyzes the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Ailor.'2 Part V evaluates the court's decision and reason-
ing in Ailor.13 Finally, Part VI considers how the Ailor decision con-
tinues the courts' trend of prohibiting citizen suits under the CWA,
as well as its possible impact on subsequent litigation.1 4
II. FACTS
The citizen suit provision of the CWA was the object of debate
in Ailor.15 In that case, the city of Maynardville (the City) operated
and owned a sewage treatment plant along Bull Run Creek that
frequently overflowed into the creek. 16 In 1993, the Tennessee De-
5. See Robert Perks & Gregory Wetstone, Rewriting the Rules, Year-End Report
2002: The Bush Administration's Assault on the Environment, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, Jan. 2003 at 26 (stating that there are too few EPA enforcement officials
in United States).
6. See generally S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C. § 3668
(describing Congress' reasons for enacting CWA).
7. 368 F.3d 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2004).
8. See id. (concluding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden in proving
defendant's actions were likely to continue).
9. For a summary of the facts, see infra notes 15-33 and accompanying text.
10. For a background of the CWA, see infra notes 34-117 and accompanying
text.
11. For a further discussion of the relevant case law, see infra notes 34-117.
12. For an analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ailor, see infra notes 118-
39 and accompanying text.
13. For an evaluation of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ailor, see infra notes
140-69 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of how the court's decision in Ailor will impact future
CWA cases, see infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
15. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 587 (indicating that citizen suit provision of CWA is
under analysis).
16. See id. at 591 (describing City's violations of NPDES permit).
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partment of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) issued an Or-
der and Assessment against the City for repeatedly violating the
terms of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit.17 Specifically, the Commissioner of the TDEC
determined that the City's self-monitoring information had uncov-
ered many NPDES violations from January 1991 through December
1992.18 As a result, the Commissioner ultimately found that the
City had violated a section of the Tennessee Code which prohibited
discharge of any waste in excess of the amount allowed by the per-
mit.19 The Commissioner issued a preliminary order requiring the
City to take certain actions to bring the plant into compliance with
the law.20
The City and the TDEC eventually reached an agreement and
jointly created an Agreed Order.21 The Agreed Order required the
City to submit the following: (1) a corrective action plan address-
ing a review of "mini-systems," smoke-testing, dry weather flow mea-
surements, a physical survey of the systems and wet weather flow
monitoring; (2) an engineering report evaluating "current hydrau-
lic and organic loading at the wastewater treatment plant" with rec-
ommendations for alternatives for additional treatment capacity;
and (3) plans and specifications for the expansion of the waste-
17. See id. (describing TDEC's permit). Currently, there are two possible ways
to obtain NPDES permits: from the United States Environmental Protection
Agency or from states with approval to issue these permits. See NORTHWEST Evi-
RONMENTAL ADVOCATES, Clean Water Program: Point Source Controls, http://www.north
westenvironmentaladvocates.org/programs/3W.html (describing distribution of
NPDES permits). NPDES permits specifically delineate the amount of pollutants
that may be "lawfully discharged from each point source." See id.
18. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 591 (describing Commissioner's conclusions). In his
Order, the Commissioner, J.W. Luna, stated that the City had committed ninety-
nine biochemical oxygen, four total suspended solids, twenty-seven ammonia, nine
fecal coliform, and nine chlorine violations. Id. Additionally, the Order stated
that the City violated TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-3-108(b) (3) and (6) because it dis-
charged "wastewater effluent from the plant in violation of the terms and condi-
tions of the NPDES permit." Id.
19. See id. (finding that City violated Tennessee Code).
20. See id. (explaining Commissioner's findings and subsequent Order). Ten-
nessee Code sections 69-3-108(b) (3) and (6) state that it is unlawful for a person to
discharge wastes in excess of the permit or to discharge wastes into waters or any
location from which it is probable that the wastes will move into waters without a
valid period. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-3-108(b)(3) and (6). Specifically, the
Order required the City to (1) begin a "continuous collection rehabilitation pro-
gram" within sixty days of the Order; (2) bring the plant into compliance with the
CWA and the City's NPDES permit within ninety days of the Order; and (3) pay a
civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars to the TDEC. Ailor, 368 F.3d at 591-592
(describing Order).
21. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 592 (stating that Board and City entered into Agreed
Order on July 18, 1995).
20051
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water treatment plant and the correction of inflow and infiltra-
tion. 22 Furthermore, the Agreed Order set out a timeline for the
City to complete these objectives, specifying that the City complete
the remedial activities no later than thirty-six months from the ap-
proval of the plans. 23 Finally, the Agreed Order levied an $18,750
civil penalty against the City. 2 4
On January 30, 1998, after the Agreed Order, Betty Lynch and
Harry Ailor brought suit against the City in the Eastern District of
Tennessee at Knoxville, alleging that the City had violated its
NPDES permits. 2 5 The City accomplished each of the Order's re-
quirements and opened a new wastewater treatment plant in No-
vember 2000.26 Ailor gave the City notice of the pending lawsuit on
February 7, 2001.27 The City received its final inspection report on
February 26, 2001.28
The district court granted summary judgment to the City
under the CWA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) on November 5, 2001, concluding that "under the unique
facts of the case, a claim under the CWA is moot at this time and
was moot at the time it was filed."29 The district court explained
that the relief available to Ailor under both the CWA and the RCRA
had already been granted.30
22. See id. (listing requirements necessary for City to comply with Board's
Order).
23. See id. (listing requirements of Board's Order).
24. See id. (describing penalty ordered against City). The Order stipulated
that the City had to pay $16,875 of the total $18,750 only if the City did not obey
the Order. Id.
25. See id. at 590 (stating that Ailor and Lynch brought citizen suit against
City). Ailor owned approximately thirty-six acres of land along Bull Run Creek,
while Lynch owned approximately one hundred acres of land along the creek. Id.
at 591. Ailor previously owned land along Bull Run Creek before the suit was
brought, but did not own the land when he brought suit. Id.
26. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 592 (describing how City completed each of Board's
requirements). The City spent approximately 1.7 million dollars to upgrade the
plant. Id. at 593.
27. See id. at 593 (noting date Plaintiffs gave notice to City). The Sixth Circuit
specifically mentioned that the Plaintiffs gave notice two and one-half months after
the City's wastewater treatment plant was in full operation. Id.
28. See id. at 592 (stating City completed all required actions under Agreed
Order, placed new wastewater treatment plant on line in November 2000, and re-
ceived inspection report from Board).
29. See id. at 594 (quoting district court's decision).
30. See id. (restating district court's holding that relief under CWA and RCRA
had already been granted).
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On May 16, 2001, Ailor again filed suit against the City, this
time in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.31 The City moved for
summary judgment on September 10, 2001, arguing that it was al-
ready the subject of an enforcement action diligently prosecuted by
the state under Title 33 U.S.C. Section 13 19 (g) (6) (A) (ii) and that
it had also abided by the state's Agreed Order. 32 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs'
suit was duplicative of the TDEC's prior actions to prevent the City
from violating the CWA.3 3
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act in a Nutshell
In response to the public's increasing awareness of water pollu-
tion and its effects, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act).34 The Clean
Water Act (CWA) was amended in 1977.35 Congress passed the
CWA to "restore the chemical, physical and biological integrity of
the nation's navigable waters. '3 6 To accomplish this goal, Congress
31. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 594 (mentioning date on which Plaintiffs filed suit in
federal court).
32. See id. at 593 (restating City's argument). The City supported its motion
for summary judgment with affidavits from Hazel Gillenwater (Gillenwater), the
City Recorder, and John West (West), an environmental specialist for TDEC. Id.
In his affidavit, West stated that he was responsible for monitoring, compliance
and enforcement of the City's wastewater treatment facilities and the City's NPDES
permit. Id. West maintained that, as of September 7, 2001, the plant had com-
plied with the laws relating to its operation of the plant and met the effluent stan-
dards that the NPDES permit specified. Id. The inspector also concluded in his
affidavit that the City had complied with the necessary requirements of the Agreed
Order. Id.
33. See id. at 600 (holding that plaintiffs were not compelled to file suit be-
cause City had met its permit obligations). The Sixth Circuit explained that the
plaintiffs were not filing a suit against the City because the federal and state gov-
ernments were failing to take action to prevent the City from violating its NPDES
permit. Id.
34. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Laws and Regulations: Clean
Water Act, Feb. 20, 2003, http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/cwa.htm (setting
forth history of CWA).
35. See id. (describing CWA). When Congress originally enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, its method of solving water pollution problems was to
provide financial incentives to encourage the states to solve water pollution
problems. See Ann K. Wooster, Actions Brought Under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act) (33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq.) - Supreme Court
Cases, 163 A.L.R. FED. 531, 544 n.9 (2004) (citing S. REP. No. 414, at 1 (1971)).
Congress' initial method of diminishing water pollution problems proved ineffec-
tive so Congress amended the Act in 1972. Id.
36. See Claudia Copeland, CRS Report for Congress: Clean Water Act and TMDLs,
Sept. 11, 1997, http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/water/h2o-24.cfm
(noting Congress' reasons for enacting CWA). The Clean Water Act is the popular
2005]
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included both regulatory and non-regulatory tools to reduce the
amount of pollutants companies and other entities discharge into
the waterways. 3
7
Under the CWA, industrial, municipal or other facilities may
only dump their discharge directly into surface waters if they obtain
NPDES permits. 38 A NPDES permit authorizes an amount of a
given pollutant that an entity may lawfully discharge from each
point source.39 A point source is "any discernible, confined, and
discrete conveyance" of pollutants into a water body.40 In other
words, the NPDES program controls water pollution through the
regulation of point sources that discharge pollutants into United
States waters.4
1
B. CWA Citizen Suits
Pursuant to the CWA, individual citizens may bring suits
against alleged violators of the CWA.4 2 Section 505 of the CWA
governs these citizen suits. 43 Under section 505, a citizen may bring
name for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Id. Con-
gress' goal was to "achieve the broader goal of restoring and maintaining the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters so that they can
support 'the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recrea-
tion in and on the water.'" Id.
37. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Introduction to the Clean
Water Act, Mar. 13, 2003, http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/cwa/ (explaining that
EPA uses regulatory and non-regulatory tools to sharply reduce direct pollutant
discharges into waterways, finance municipal wastewater treatment facilities and
manage polluted runoff).
38. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), Dec. 8, 2003, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ (discussing
point in time when facilities must obtain NPDES permits). Only EPA or a state
possessing EPA approval may issue NPDES permits. Id.
39. See id. (giving explanation of NPDES permits).
40. See River Network, Point Source Discharge Permits/NPDES: The National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System, http://www.cleanwateract.org/pages/c3.htm
(describing point sources and discrete conveyances). A discrete conveyance in-
cludes, but is not limited to, "any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, dis-
crete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
landfill leachate collection system, vessel or other floating craft from which pollu-
tants are or may be discharged." See id.
41. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), Dec. 8, 2003), http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/ (describ-
ing how NPDES permits regulate water pollution). A point source is "a specific,
identifiable source." See Gail Bellenger, What is The Clean Water Act?, 2002, http://
pa.essortment.com/cleanwateract-rgrl.htm. Agencies have been better able to
regulate point source pollutants. Id. Researchers have only recently begun to reg-
ulate non-point source pollutants, such as those from storm runoff. Id.
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (explaining when citizens can bring suits
under CWA).
43. See id. (stating that § 505 governs citizen suits). Section 505 provides in
pertinent part that any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf
6
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a suit to enforce any limitation in an NPDES permit.4 4 Section 505
defines a citizen as "a person or persons having an interest which is
or may be adversely affected." 45 In addition, the citizen or citizens
bringing suit against the alleged violator must give sixty days notice
to the administrator, the state in which the alleged violation oc-
curred and the alleged violator.46 This notice gives the alleged vio-
lator an opportunity to comply with its permits and provides the
state agency with time to pursue further enforcement measures. 47
When examining whether the suit is permitted under the CWA,
courts must first decide whether the plaintiff has standing and
whether the issue in the case is moot.48
1. Standing Under the CWA
In order to establish standing, the Supreme Court requires the
plaintiff to prove that: (1) he or she has suffered an "injury in fact"
that is concrete, particularized and actual or imminent; (2) the in-
jury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged actions; and
(3) it is likely, not speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 49 In environmental suits, plaintiffs establish "in-
jury in fact" by proving that they use the area the alleged violator
has harmed and that the violator has damaged the aesthetic and
recreational values of the area.50 In Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Envi-
against any person alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation
under this Act or an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation, or against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act. Id.
44. See 33 U.S.C. § 13 65 (g) (stating that citizens can bring suits to enforce
NPDES permits).
45. See id. (defining citizens under CWA). Section 1365(g) defines a "citizen"
as a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected. Id.
In order for citizens to bring suits under the CWA, they must prove that they have
an interest that will be adversely affected. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (describing what
citizens must prove to bring suits under CWA). When the courts analyze whether
citizens have proven they have an interest in the litigation that will be adversely
affected under the CWA, they cross into the standing analysis. See Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (assuming standing inquiry and CWA
are related).
46. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 174-75 (describing CWA notice provision).
47. See Brad Rath and Tammy L. Shaw, Civil Penalties Provide Relief for Environ-
mental Plaintiffs, June 16, 2005, http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/MS-AL/
Water%20Log/laidlaw.htm (explaining benefits of notice provision of CWA).
48. See generally Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (analyzing mootness and standing re-
garding CWA citizen suit provision).
49. See id. (describing standing requirement).
50. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (describing how
plaintiffs can meet "injury in fact" requirement).
2005]
7
Stratis: Ailor v. City of Maynardville, Tennessee: What Constitutes Compli
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
292 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVI: p. 285
ronment,51 the Supreme Court established that citizens lose standing
if the alleged violations have abated by the time suit is filed.52 Spe-
cifically, the Court held that, in environmental suits, the plaintiffs
must prove injury to themselves, not to the environment. 53
2. Mootness Under the CWA
When describing the legal doctrine of mootness, the Supreme
Court has explained that an "actual controversy" must exist at all
stages of the case.54 If an issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review," the issue is not moot.5 5 Establishing mootness in environ-
mental cases is especially complicated because it is difficult to prove
that the defendant's violation is capable of repeating itself.56 The
Supreme Court's ruling in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw57 directly
addressed how courts should decide mootness; however, the Court's
decision failed to clarify its preferred method for deciding moot-
ness in environmental cases. 58 Consequently, a court's interpreta-
51. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
52. See id. (describing and rejecting Laidlaw's contention that Supreme
Court's reasoning in Steel Co. implies that citizen plaintiffs in Laidlaw have no
standing to seek redress under CWA). See also Robert Meltz, CRS Report for Congress:
RS20012: The Future of the Citizen Suit After Steel Co. and Laidlaw, Jan. 5, 1999,
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-38.cfm?&CFID= 19131415&
CFTOKEN=66408933 (describing citizen suit provision under CWA and how Su-
preme Court decided Steel Co.).
53. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181 (setting forth requirements plaintiffs must
meet to prove Article III standing in environmental cases).
54. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (explaining that usual rule in
federal cases is that actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari
review). In Roe, the Supreme Court held that pregnancy "provides a classic justifi-
cation for a conclusion of nonmootness" because it could be "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review." Id.
55. See id. (describing mootness).
56. See John D. Echeverria, Standing and Mootness Decisions in the Wake of
Laidlaw, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 183, 192 (2003) (noting Supreme Court's acknowl-
edgement that proving mootness in environmental cases is difficult). See also Jo-
seph T. Phillips, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services: Impact, Outcomes, and the Future Viability of Environmental Citizen Suits, 68 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1281, 1291 (2000).
57. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
58. See Echeverria, supra note 56, at 192 (explaining two possible interpreta-
tions of Laidlaw). One could construe the holding to mean that the Court over-
ruled the previous rule that a civil penalty claim can never become moot. Id. This
interpretation implies that it would be difficult, but not impossible, to prove that a
citizen suit seeking civil penalties is moot. Id. Another interpretation of Laidlaw is
that the Supreme Court was not overruling its previous rule, yet simply concluding
that a citizen suit under the CWA is not automatically moot when the plaintiffs
only remaining claim is for civil penalties. Id.
8
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tion of mootness is crucial to determining the outcome of a citizen
suit case under the CWA. 5
9
3. Is the Citizen Suit Barred Under the CWA?
Citizen suits under the CWA are subject to additional procedu-
ral requirements. 60 If the state or federal government is "diligently
prosecuting" a claim against the defendant, this bars any other ac-
tions pertaining to the violations the plaintiff alleged in the suit.6 '
Nevertheless, if the government is diligently prosecuting a state ad-
ministrative proceeding or a regulatory agency's response action,
the CWA does not prohibit a citizen from bringing suit.62
4. The Controversy
In the past, CWA provisions have been the subject of heated
debate, particularly the citizen suit provision, which has created a
storm of controversy. 63 The most contested part of section 505 pro-
vides that "[n] o action may be commenced.., if the Administrator
or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require
59. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 192 (reasoning that courts' interpretation of moot-
ness in citizen suits impacts courts' rulings).
60. See Randall S. Abate, Rethinking Citizen Suits for Past Violations of Federal En-
vironmental Laws: Recommendations for the Next Decade of Applying the Gwaltney Stan-
dard, 16 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (1997) (discussing procedural requirements
citizen must meet to bring suit under CWA). Citizens bringing suit under the
CWA must give sixty days notice of their action to the EPA Administrator, the state
in which the alleged violation occurs and the alleged violator. Id. Furthermore, if
the court finds that EPA or the state has "commenced and is diligently prosecuting
a civil or criminal action," the court will bar the citizen suit. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) (2001)).
61. See Are Citizen Suit Provisions of the Clean Water Act Being Misused?: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Water Res. And Env't 108th Cong. (2004), available
at http://www.house.gov/ transportation /water/ 09-30-04/ 09-30-O4memo. html
(hereinafter SUBCOMITTEE HEARINCG) (explaining circumstances under which citi-
zens cannot bring suit under CWA).
62. See Charles C. Steincamp, Citizenship: A Discussion of Environmental Citizen
Suits, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 72, 74-75 (1999) (describing when courts bar citizen suits
under CWA).
63. SeeJeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the "Diligent Prosecution" Citizen Suit
Preclusion, 10 WIDENER. L. SvaMp. J. 63, 64 (2003) (noting that courts have consid-
ered nearly one dozen legal issues concerning bar element in preclusion device).
Id. See also Amanda J. Masucci, Comment, Stand By Me: The Fourth Circuit Raises
Standing Requirements In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp. Just
As Long As You Stand, Stand By Me, 12 VILL. ENrvL. L.J. 171, 179-180 (2001) (main-
taining that citizen suits under CWA have proven to be controversial issue). See
also Matthew M. Werner, Comment, Mootness and Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims
Under the Clean Water Act: A Post-Lujan Reassessment, 25 ENVTL. L. 801 (1995) (not-
ing that, when government fails to force compliance, private citizens' rights to en-
force CWA remain unresolved).
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compliance with the standard, limitation, or order .... ,,64 Specifi-
cally, courts have debated the interpretation of the words "dili-
gently prosecuting." 65 Some scholars claim that diligently prosecut-
ing an action requires the Administrator or State to accomplish
what it set out to do.66 In other words, the Administrator or State
must definitively prevent the violator from continuing its abuses of
the CWA.6 7 Thus, in the case of the CWA, the Administrator or
State must: (1) guarantee that the violator ceases to exceed its
NPDES limits; and (2) ensure that the violator does not continue to
violate the permit in the future. 68
The public has conflicting views concerning the utility of citi-
zen suits. 6 9 Proponents of citizen suits claim that these suits make
the protection of the environment possible when the government
fails to do so. 70 These same supporters also claim that citizen suits
have been essential to advancing environmental enforcement. 71
Additional citizen suit advocates assert that citizen suits combat po-
64. See Patrick Kurtas, Casenote, Lowering the Bar: The Sixth Circuit Embraces the
Ninth Circuit's Narrow Interpretation of Section 1319(g)(6) of the Clean Water Act in Ru-
dolph Jones, Jr.; Susan Jones; Tandy Jones Gilliland v. City of Lakeland, Tennessee, 12
VILL. EN rL. L.J. 235, 237 (2001) (stating that courts have conflicting interpreta-
tions of intended scope of CWA).
65. SeeJulia A. Glazer, The Clean Water Act Enforcement Provision: What Consti-
tutes Diligent Enforcement Under Comparable State Law, 23 N. Ky. L. REv. 129 (1995)
(commenting that absence of guidance concerning diligent enforcement under
CWA from Supreme Court and Congress created conflicting opinions within cir-
cuit courts).
66. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against
Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens: Part One: Statutory
Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 Hhv. EN VL. L. REv. 401 (2004) (discussing mean-
ing of "diligently prosecuting" under CWA). Scholars have opined that the lan-
guage of the preclusion device and the purposes of the statutes imply that diligent
prosecution is prosecution that has brought or reasonably can be expected to
bring about compliance. Id.
67. See id. (explaining some believe that Administrator or State must prevent
violator from breaching requirements of CWA in order for Administrator or State
to diligently prosecute action).
68. See id. (setting out what state or administrator must do to enforce CWA).
69. See Abate, supra note 60 (describing controversy over CWA).
70. See Defenders of Wildlife, The Public In Action: Using State Citizen Suit Stat-
utes to Protect Biodiversity, Sept. 2000, available at http://www.defenders.org/states/
publications/publicinaction.pdf (stating that citizen suits made it possible to pro-
tect environment when government could not do so). Proponents of citizen suits
under the CWA rationalize that public involvement is necessary because federal
governmental agencies do not always enforce the CWA. Id.
71. See Peter A. Appel, The Diligent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits: The Search for
Adequate Representation, 10 WIDENER. L. SyMp. J. 91 (2003) (noting that citizen
enforcement of federal environmental law has advanced environmental
enforcement).
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tential environmental hazards that the government would not oth-
erwise prevent.72
Critics of citizen suits, however, do not believe that citizen suits
are more advantageous than agency oversight.73 These critics claim
that citizen suits do not further the environmental cause because
they focus only on technical violations or breaches that a govern-
ment regulator is presently addressing.74 In his congressional testi-
mony, Mayor Jere Melo of Fort Bragg, California claimed that
Congress should amend the citizen suit provision under the CWA
in order to prevent citizens' misuse of the provision. 75 Melo and
other critics of citizen suits argue that the money citizens pay law-
yers to bring suits against the alleged violators would be better
spent improving the environment. 76
Scholars have proposed various interpretations of the citizen
suit provision of the CWA.77 Certain legal scholars claim that
72. See Lori May Peters, Comment, Reloading the Arsenal in the Informational
War on Pollution - Citizens As Soldiers in the Fight and How a Lack of "Actionable" Legs
On Which to Stand Nearly Forced a Cease-Fire, 10 ViuL. ENVrL. LJ. 127, 159 (1999)
(discussing citizen groups' importance to EPA enforcement due to EPA's limited
budget). See also Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on Future
Justiciability Decisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1003
(2001) (noting government's lack of resources to adequately enforce environmen-
tal laws); State Environmental Resource Center, Citizen Suits-What Are They?,
http://www.serconline.org/citizensuits/fact.html (describing citizen suit and its
benefits).
73. See Steincamp, supra note 62 (noting that defendant may claim that citi-
zen suit is unsuccessful in giving plaintiffs unique or additional relief in situations
where defendant is conducting remedial activities under agency supervision).
74. See SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING, supra note 61. "Citizen suits do little or noth-
ing to enhance water quality, because the suits involve violations that are already
being addressed in an enforcement action with government regulators and/or
that they focus on what can be characterized as minor, sporadic, or technical viola-
tions."' Id.
75. See id. (claiming that Congress needs to amend CWA citizen suit provi-
sion).
76. See id. (alleging that citizen suits waste money). In California, government
officials complained that citizen suits have caused sewer upgrades and have "cost
taxpayers millions of dollars for attorneys' fees." Id. Many critics of citizen suits
claim that the citizens frequently bring CWA suits because they receive financial
benefits from these suits. Id. See also U.S. HOUSE TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUC-
TURE COMMITTEE, Communities Outline Misuses of Clean Water Act Citizen Suits At Con-
gressional Hearing, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.waterchat.com/News/Environment/
04/Q4/env_041001-02.htm (noting that many communities targeted by citizen
suits settle instead of litigate).
77. See Abate, supra note 60 (discussing fact that courts frequently misinter-
pret and disagree about extent of citizen suits under Clean Water Act). "The Su-
preme Court's decision in Gwaltney is perhaps the most extensively analyzed yet
most frequently misunderstood standard in citizen suit jurisprudence under fed-
eral environmental laws." Id.
2005]
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courts should interpret the citizen suit provision broadly, so as to
prohibit citizens from bringing a suit against a violator after an
agency has taken action against the violator.78 Others criticize the
courts for attempting to prevent citizen suits by forcing plaintiffs to
establish standing to a degree of "scientific certainty." 79
The Supreme Court has taken its own approach to analyzing
citizen suits.80 The Court mandates that, even before deciding
whether the plaintiff-citizens have a case under the CWA, plaintiffs
must demonstrate that they have standing and that the violation
alleged in the suit is not moot.81 After satisfying these two require-
ments, the plaintiff-citizens must then fulfill the CWA's
requirements. 82
C. Applicable Cases
1. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation83
Gwaltney has served as guidance for the lower courts to deter-
mine the protocol for cases addressing citizen suits under the
CWA.84 In Gwaltney, the Virginia State Water Control Board issued
an NPDES permit to ITT-Gwaltney in 1974, allowing Gwaltney to
discharge seven pollutants from the company's meatpacking plant
on the Pagan River in Smithfield, Virginia.85 Gwaltney of Smith-
field (a different entity from ITT-Gwaltney) took over the obliga-
tions of the permit in 1981 and, from 1981-1984, repeatedly ex-
78. See id. (stating that some critics claim citizen suit provision should be
broadly interpreted).
79. See Masucci, supra note 63, at 208-09 (noting that heightened requirement
will prevent plaintiffs with legitimate claims from obtaining relief, thereby aggra-
vating Congress' purpose for enacting citizen suit provision of CWA).
80. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (stating that CWA's definition of citizen makes it clear that
plaintiffs bringing suits under CWA must have standing).
81. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180-94 (assess-
ing standing and mootness issues before analyzing plaintiffs' claims under CWA).
See also Neil S. Witkes, Supreme Court Liberalizes Requirements to Maintain Environmen-
tal Citizen Suit Claims, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 20, 2000, available at http://www.
mgkflaw.com/articles/suprrncrtliberalrequireenvironcitizen.hml (noting that de-
fendants focus discovery efforts on dismissing plaintiffs' suit for lack of standing).
82. See generally Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (noting that plaintiff must fulfill CWA
requirements).
83. 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987).
84. See Masucci, supra note 63 (explaining that many courts have looked to
Gwaltney as authority for citizen suits under CWA).
85. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 53 (1987) (describing permit from Virginia State Water Control Board). This
permit also specified effluent limitations, monitoring requirements, and other
conditions of discharge. Id. The Board reissued the permit in 1979 and modified
it in 1980. Id.
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ceeded the effluent limitations on five of the pollutants specified in
the permit.8 6 From 1982-1984, Gwaltney installed certain equip-
ment in an attempt to conform to the limitations of the permit.
8 7
Gwaltney's last substantial violations occurred on May 15, 1984,
after it had installed new equipment.88 Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion (Chesapeake) instituted a suit against Gwaltney, claiming that
Gwaltney had and would continue to violate the permit in the fu-
ture.89 In response, Gwaltney moved for dismissal of the suit, claim-
ing that it had not been in violation of the CWA when Chesapeake
brought the suit.90 The district court rejected Gwaltney's argu-
ment, concluding that section 505 authorizes citizens to bring en-
forcement actions on the basis of wholly past violations.91 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that whether Gwaltney was "in viola-
tion" at the time of the suit was irrelevant to its decision.9 2 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.93 The Fourth
Circuit's ruling resulted in a three-way circuit split as to when viola-
tions must occur for the court to permit citizen suits.
94
86. See id. (noting Gwaltney's violations). Specifically, Gwaltney violated its to-
tal Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) limitation 87 times, its chlorine limitation 34 times,
and its fecal coliform limitation 31 times between 1981 and 1984. Id. Three of the
most substantial violations involved fecal, coliform, chlorine, and TKN. Id.
87. See id. at 53-54 (describing Gwaltney's installment of new equipment).
Gwaltney installed new equipment to improve its chlorination system in 1982, and
its last reported chlorine violation occurred in October 1982. Id. This chlorina-
tion system also helped to control the discharge of fecal coliform, thus Gwaltney's
last fecal coliform violation was in February 1984. Id. In addition, Gwaltney in-
stalled an upgraded wastewater treatment system in October 1983; its last recorded
reported TKN violation occurred on May 15, 1984. Id.
88. See id. at 54 (describing actions that Gwaltney took to prevent itself from
violating limitations set by its NPDES permit and results of its actions).
89. See id. (describing Respondents, Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural
Resources Defense Council's allegations against Petitioner, Gwaltney).
90. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 55 (stating that Gwaltney moved to dismiss suit).
The District Court had held that § 505 allows citizens to bring enforcement actions
on the basis of wholly past violations. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's decision, and concluded that § 505 "can be read to comprehend un-
lawful conduct that occurred only prior to the filing of a lawsuit as well as unlawful
conduct that continues into the present." Id. at 56.
91. See id. at 56 (rejecting Gwaltney's argument).
92. See id. at 55 (determining Gwaltney was in violation).
93. See id. at 56 ("... § 505 'can be read to comprehend unlawful conduct
that occurred only prior to the filing of a lawsuit as well as unlawful conduct that
continues into the present."') (quoting Gwaltney v. Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304, 309
(4th Cir. 1986)). The Fourth Circuit held that § 505 of the CWA could be inter-
preted to allow citizen suits for violations that occurred only prior to the filing of
the suit, as well as unlawful conduct occurring in the present. See Gwaltney, 791
F.2d at 309.
94. See id. (describing three way split). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the conflicts between the First, Fourth and Fifth Circuits. Id. The First
Circuit held that the courts have jurisdiction under § 505 when "the citizen-plain-
2005]
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit
split and held that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly concluded that
respondents could bring an action based on wholly past violations
of the CWA.95 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court evalu-
ated methods of interpreting section 505.96 Specifically, the Court
addressed the point at which the violation must occur so that a citi-
zen can bring suit against the violator.97 By looking at the statute
itself and the Senate and House Reports regarding section 505, the
Court analyzed the meaning of the statute. 98 The Supreme Court
highlighted Congress' intention for the states to bring the majority
of suits under the CWA and that citizen suits are proper only "if the
Federal, State and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement
responsibility." 99 Ultimately, the Supreme Court in Gwaltney held
that the CWA permitted citizen suits for violations, so long as the
plaintiff alleged ongoing noncompliance. 100
2. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Laidlaw, which held that
a citizen suit is not moot when the defendant has complied with its
permit.10 1 The defendant, Laidlaw Environmental Services (Laid-
law), bought a hazardous waste incinerator which included a waste-
tiff fairly alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will
again proceed to violate the Act." Id. (citing Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Coba-
Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1986)). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that "a complaint brought under [section 505] must allege a violation
occurring at the time the complaint is filed." Id. at 55. (citing Hamker v. Diamond
Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392 (1985)). When the Fourth Circuit concluded
in Gwaltney that "[s] ection 505 'can be read to comprehend unlawful conduct that
occurred only prior to the filing of a lawsuit as well as unlawful conduct that con-
tinues into the present,"' the Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari to resolve
this issue. Id.
95. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67 (criticizing Fourth Circuit's holding).
96. See id. at 56-64 (analyzing language of § 505 of CWA).
97. See id. at 57. "The most natural reading of "to be in violation" is a require-
ment that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent viola-
tion ... ." Id.
98. See id. (maintaining that courts should first look at language of statutes to
interpret them).
99. See id. at 60 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414 at 64 (1971), reprinted in A Legisla-
tive History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 1482 (1973))
(noting intent stated in Senate Report).
100. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 65 (determining when citizen suits are permit-
ted under CWA). The Supreme Court concluded that, "[t]he bar on citizen suits
when government enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen suit is
meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action." Id. at 61.
101. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 173-74 (stating that appellate court erred when
deciding that citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties must be dismissed as moot
when defendant has come into compliance after commencement of litigation).
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water treatment plant. 10 2 That same year, the South Carolina De-
partment of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) granted
Laidlaw an NPDES permit to discharge treated water into the North
Tyger River. 10 3 After receiving the permit, Laidlaw began discharg-
ing pollutants into the North Tyger River, yet it repeatedly violated
the limitations set by the permit.1 0 4 Laidlaw last violated the permit
in January of 1995, after the plaintiffs had filed their complaint and
two years before the court's judgment.10 5 The Fourth Circuit held
that the case was moot because the remedies available to the plain-
tiffs could not redress the injuries the defendants caused. 10 6
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's ruling, con-
cluding that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly held that courts must
dismiss a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties as moot when a
defendant has come into NPDES compliance after the litigation
had already begun.10 7 The Court's ruling in Laidlaw added depth
to its previous opinion in Gwaltney.10 8
102. See id. at 174 (stating facts of case).
103. See id. at 176-77 (describing South Carolina's DHEC permit).
104. See id. at 177 (describing Laidlaw's violations of permit). In addition to
repeatedly exceeding the limitations set by the permit, Laidlaw also repeatedly
failed to meet the permit's daily average limit on mercury discharges. Id.
105. See id. at 178 (stating when Laidlaw violated permit).
106. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 179 (stating Fourth Circuit's holding).
107. See id. at 195 (reversing Fourth Circuit's decision). The Supreme Court
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. In
making its decision, the Supreme Court addressed whether the plaintiffs possessed
standing, whether the issue was moot, and whether the citizens were barred from
bringing the suit under the CWA. Id. at 180-94. The Fourth Circuit had relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Steel Co., claiming that the case had become moot
because civil penalties payable to the government were the only remedies available
to Friends of the Earth, which would not redress Friends of the Earth's injuries. See
id. at 173-74. The Supreme Court contended that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly
applied its decision in Steel Co. to the facts in Laidlaw. See id. at 187-88. The Su-
preme Court claimed that the facts in Steel Co. differed from those in Laidlaw be-
cause in Steel Co., the plaintiffs did not allege a continuing or imminent violation.
Id. Unlike in Laidlaw, the Supreme Court never reached the issue of standing in
Steel Co. Id. at 188. In Steel Co., the Supreme Court did not address whether plain-
tiffs can seek penalties for violations that are continuing at the time of the com-
plaint and could continue into the future. Id.
108. See id. (comparing decisions in Laidlaw and Gwaltney). In Gwaltney, the
Court decided that § 505 does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations, yet
the plaintiffs made a good faith allegation that the violation was continuous or
intermittent, so the Court remanded the case for further consideration. Id. at 64.
20051
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3. Jones v. City of Lakeland'0 9
The issue of citizen suit provisions under the CWA also arose in
Jones.110 In this case, the plaintiffs, landowners along Oliver Creek,
brought a suit against the City of Lakeland, Tennessee (Lakeland),
alleging that Lakeland continuously discharged toxic, noxious and
hazardous substances into Oliver Creek in violation of Lakeland's
NPDES permit.11 Lakeland claimed that because the TDEC and
the Tennessee Water Control Board were already "diligently prose-
cuting" an action against the City to require compliance with its
permit, it precluded the plaintiffs' actions under Title 33 U.S.C.
Section 1365(a).112 The Sixth Circuit rejected Lakeland's argu-
ment, explaining that a citizen suit is precluded only if the EPA
Administrator or a state is diligently prosecuting an enforcement
action in a court of the United States. 113
Next, the court focused on whether Title 33 U.S.C. Section
13 19 (g)(A) precluded the plaintiffs' action against Lakeland. 114
Under section 13 19 (g) (A), the Sixth Circuit analyzed whether the
state enforcement provision was comparable to the federal enforce-
ment provision.11 5 The court concluded that the Tennessee stat-
utes were not comparable to Title 33 U.S.C. Section 1365 (a) (1) (b)
and/or Title 33 U.S.C. Section 1319 (g) (6) because the Tennessee
statutes deny citizens access to the courts and the opportunity to
participate at certain stages of the administrative process.1 16 Conse-
quently, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' action was not
barred and thus, remanded the case. 117
109. 224 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 1999).
110. See McAbee v. Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1253-1254 (2003) (noting that issue
of citizen suit provisions under the CWA also arose in Jones v. City of Lakeland).
111. See id. at 521 (describing plaintiffs allegations).
112. See id. at 520 (noting Lakeland's defense).
113. See id. at 522 (rejecting defendant's argument). In rejecting Lakeland's
argument, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning in Friends of the
Earth. Id.
114. See Jones, 224 F.3d at 523 (discussing preclusion of citizen suits). 33
U.S.C. § 13 19 (g) (A) states that if a state has begun or is diligently prosecuting an
action under a comparable state law, a citizen cannot bring a suit against the al-
leged violator. Id.
115. See id. (analyzing state and federal enforcement provisions).
116. See id. at 524 (concluding that state statute is not comparable to prosecu-
tion under Act).
117. See id. (stating that FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) do not bar
plaintiffs' action).
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Ailor, the Sixth Circuit considered whether to uphold the
district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. 118
The court first considered the validity of Ailor's CWA claim, specifi-
cally addressing whether Ailor had standing to bring suit and
whether Ailor's claim was moot.1 19 Next, the court examined
Ailor's RCRA claim against the City. 120 Finally, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding granting the City's motion for
summary judgment. 121
First, the Sixth Circuit described the CWA and Congress' rea-
sons for enacting it.122 Specifically, the court addressed how the
section 505 citizen suit provision functioned under the CWA. 12 3
The Sixth Circuit maintained that "citizen suits are merely intended
to supplement, not supplant, enforcement by state and federal gov-
ernment agencies." 124 As a result, the court determined that the
CWA "does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations." 125
Further, the Sixth Circuit noted that in Jones it held that an action
under the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act is not comparable
to federal statutes. 126 As such, a proceeding before TDEC is
not a "court enforcement" for purposes of sections 1319 (g) and
1365(a). 127
After its analysis, the court determined that Ailor raised both
standing and mootness issues because the State of Tennessee had
previously ordered the City to install a new wastewater treatment
plant to bring the plant into compliance with the NPDES permit
118. See Ailar v. City of Maynardville, Tennessee, 368 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir.
2004) (maintaining that Sixth Circuit will review district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo).
119. See id. at 595-601 (examining whether Plaintiffs had standing to bring
suit under CWA and whether issue was moot).
120. See id. at 601 (examining RCRA claim).
121. See id. (affirming district court's decision). The court reviewed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. at 595.
122. See id. at 590-91 (describing background and requirements of Clean
Water Act).
123. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 590-91 (explaining how citizen suit provision fits
into Clean Water Act).
124. See id. at 590 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49 (1987)) (determining that citizen suits should supplement agency
action).
125. See id. (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64) (holding that citizen suits are
precluded for wholly past violations).
126. See id. at 602 (noting that Tennessee Water Quality Control Act is not
comparable to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1) (B) and/or 33 U.S.C. § 13 19(g) (6) (A) (ii)).
127. See id. at 602 (reiterating Sixth Circuit's holding in Jones).
20051
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before Ailor brought the federal action. 128 The Sixth Circuit indi-
cated that if a court could no longer provide "meaningful relief,"
the case is moot because it is not likely that the court can redress
the injury by bestowing a favorable decision. 129 The court con-
cluded that it was arguable whether the plaintiffs had properly al-
leged continuing violations, but that it would assume standing. 130
Next, the Sixth Circuit examined whether Ailor's claim was
moot.131 The court maintained that "a case is moot when the issues
presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cogniza-
ble interest in the outcome."1 3 2 The Sixth Circuit determined that
Ailor's claim was moot because, during the seven years previous to
Ailor's giving notice of the suit to the City, the State of Tennessee
was supervising remedial efforts to prevent violations of the NPDES
permit.1 33 Furthermore, the court concluded that when the plain-
tiffs brought suit against the City, they no longer had an "injury in
fact" that was "actual or imminent" because by this point in time
"the City had installed and made operational a new wastewater
treatment plant.., to bring it into compliance with its NPDES per-
mit.' 34 The Sixth Circuit added, ". . . but for the fortuity of four
minor discharges in February, March, and May of 2001, Lynch
clearly lacked standing, because the relief requested in the com-
plaint was by that time for wholly past violations."' 3 5 When assess-
ing whether the district court made the proper decision regarding
standing, the Sixth Circuit compared Ailor to Gwaltney, noting that
128. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 596-97 (determining that case concerns both stand-
ing and mootness issues). Because events occurred after the lawsuit, thereby de-
priving the court of the ability to give meaningful relief, the case involved
mootness and standing concerns. Id.
129. See id. at 596 (describing mootness).
130. See id. at 599 (concluding that standing is assumed for plaintiffs).
131. See id. at 599-601 (examining mootness).
132. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 596 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969)). The Sixth Circuit continued to explain that "if events that occur subse-
quent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to give
meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be dismissed." See id. (citing Al
Najjar v. Ashcrofl, 273 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001)).
133. See id. at 599-601 (concluding that Plaintiffs' issue is moot).
134. See id. at 600 (concluding that Plaintiffs no longer possessed "injury in
fact"). ("[T]he case is moot, because the injuries suffered in the complaint had
been remedied by events subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit, with no showing of
a reasonable likelihood of recurrence."). Id.
135. See id. at 596-97 (determining that Lynch lacked standing because she
alleged past violations).
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the plaintiffs in both cases failed to file suit in federal court until
several weeks after the last recorded violation. 136
The Sixth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in Gwaltney stat-
ing that "the most natural reading of 'to be in violation' is a require-
ment that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or
intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past pol-
luter will continue to pollute in the future. 137 It asserted that the
citizen suit provision does not indicate that plaintiffs must prove
past violations.138 The court used the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Gwaltney to support its theory that the citizen suit provision of the
CWA required that the citizen-plaintiff prove that the violation is
presently occurring or will occur in the future.139
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The main issues in Ailor were: (1) whether the plaintiffs had
standing; (2) whether the issue in the case was moot; and (3)
whether the plaintiffs had the authority to bring a suit against the
City of Maynardville under the CWA.140 The standing and moot-
ness issues are very much intertwined with the plaintiffs' ability to
bring a suit under the CWA.141
A. Did the Plaintiffs Have Standing?
First, the Sixth Circuit concluded that both plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the suit. 14 2 Then, the court followed the Su-
preme Court's guidance in Gwaltney and examined the complaint
to see if it included "good faith allegations of continuous or inter-
mittent violations." 143 After examining the complaint, the court ap-
propriately concluded that Lynch possessed standing, while Ailor
136. See id. at 597 (determining that facts in Ailor were similar to facts in
Gwaltney).
137. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 597.
138. See id. at 597 (quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57).
139. See id. (explaining that citizen suits cannot be brought if violation wholly
occurred in past).
140. See id. The cases of Gwaltney, Laidlaw and Jones are helpful in evaluating
the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Ailor. See generally Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 (1987);
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Jones, 224 F.3d 518 (2000) (involving citizen suit
provision of CWA in each and when CWA bars these suits).
141. See generally Robert Meltz, CRS Reports for Congress: RS20497: The Pendu-
lum Swings Back: Standing Doctrine After Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, Mar. 14, 2000,
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/water/h2o-39.cfm?&CFID=936077&
CFTOKEN=18096654.
142. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 599.
143. See id. (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64).
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did not.144 This is because Lynch owned land when she filed suit,
while Ailor did not.145
The Ailor court likened the facts of the case to those in Gwalt-
ney and concluded that the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney
strengthened the district court's finding that Ailor's standing was
problematic. 146 The Supreme Court previously stated that the
CWA's "to be in violation" requirement implies that the plaintiffs
must allege a reasonable likelihood that the violator will continue
to violate in the future.147 The Sixth Circuit abruptly concluded
that there was no evidence of any violation by the City since Novem-
ber 2000.148 Despite this conclusion, the court did not recognize
that the plaintiffs initially filed suit against the City in state court on
January 30, 1998.149
B. Was the Issue in Ailor Moot?
The Sixth Circuit failed to consider precedent when it held
that the issue in Ailor was moot.150 In reaching its decision, the
144. See id. at 601-02 (Cole, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion agreed
with the majority's opinion regarding the standing issue. See id. Judge Cole stated
that the court correctly dismissed Ailor's suit because Ailor did not have standing,
yet the judge believed that the court should have let Lynch proceed to trial. Id.
When Ailor and Lynch filed the federal suit on May 16, 2001, Ailor did not own
the property that he alleged was adversely affected the City's polluting of the wa-
ters. Id. at 597 n.5.
145. See id. at 596. The Sixth Circuit appropriately held that "he [Ailor] no
longer had an injury in fact that is fairly redressable by a favorable decision since
the CWA does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations. Id. at 597 n.5.
146. See id. at 597 (comparing facts of Gwaltney to those in Ailor).
147. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57 (describing "to be in violation" requirement).
148. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 599 (noting that City had not violated its permit
since November 2000).
149. See id. at 593 (failing to recognize plaintiffs' initial filing date).
150. See id. at 596 (claiming that when plaintiffs' suit was initiated they no
longer possessed injury in fact that was actual or imminent). The dissenting opin-
ion presented how to correctly analyze the mootness issue. See id. Judge Cole
concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority's decision. See id. at 601-
02 (Cole, J., dissenting). In dissent, Judge Cole first analyzed the mootness claim
by emphasizing that as the Supreme Court stated in Laidlaw, the defendant must
satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating that it is absolutely clear the alleged
violations could not reasonably be expected to recur. Id. at 601 (citing Laidlaw,
528 U.S. 167). Further, the judge explained that the City did not meet its burden
of proving that the violation will not recur, emphasizing that the Record may have
improved the conditions in the plant, but did not definitively establish that the
City's violations would not occur again. Id. at 601-02. Judge Cole explained that
the City failed to meet the burden the Supreme Court had established in Laidlaw
because the state merely "warned of the new plant's 'very limited digester capac-
ity'" six months after the plaintiffs filed suit. Id. at 602. In addition, the judge
claimed that "[a]n undefined probability that current plant deficiencies may be
cured in the future falls short of the City's burden under Friends of the Earth." Id.
Judge Cole also indicated that due to the City's history of non-compliance with its
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Sixth Circuit misinterpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
Laidlaw, thereby disregarding Supreme Court precedent.1 5 1 Tojus-
tiff its conclusion that the claim was moot, the court distinguished
the facts in Ailor from those in Laidlaw.152 Additionally, the Sixth
Circuit claimed that even though the City was not subject to a court
order, Ailor's claims were moot because the City's conduct was not
voluntary, as it was in Laidlaw.15 3
NPDES permits, the City's six months of compliance with the permit did not estab-
lish that the City would not again violate the permits. Id. Judge Cole attacked the
majority's emphasis on the fact that the City's last violation occurred on May 2001,
noting that the court granted summary judgment only six months after the last
violation occurred. Id. The judge added that the state had reported in November
that "during the winter and spring.., the flows may be much higher." Id. Based
on the fact that the last violation had only occurred in November and the flows
would be higher in other seasons, the judge concluded that the City had not made
it "absolutely clear" that it would not violate the permits in the future. Id. Finally,
the dissent concluded that underJones, the state of Tennessee's determination that
the City substantially complied with its permit did not shield the City from citizen
suits. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that " [m] ootness addresses whether the plaintiff
continues to have an interest in the outcome of the litigation." See id. at 596 (citing
Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma, Ohio, 263 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The Sixth Circuit clarified its explanation of mootness by explaining that, "if
events that occur subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the
court of the ability to give meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be
dismissed." Id. (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001)).
151. See id. at 600 (distinguishing Laidlaw from Ailor). The court explained
that in Laidlaw, the citizens brought the suit before a state action, while, in Ailor,
the state had prompted the City to remedy the problem and the city had fixed the
problem before the Ailor brought suit. Id.
152. See id. (rationalizing that issue is moot). The Sixth Circuit concluded
that because the citizen suit in Laidlaw was instituted before any state agency's ac-
tions, there was a genuine concern in Laidlaw that the defendant would return to
its old ways. See id. The court claimed that the suit in Ailor was not truly supple-
mentary because its "conduct was certainly not 'voluntary' in the same sense as the
defendant polluter in Laidlaw." Id.
153. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 600 (concluding that plaintiffs' claims were moot
because defendants' actions were not voluntary). In Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit
held that the plaintiff had initial standing to bring the action, yet the issue in the
case was moot. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 173-74. The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's opinion, explaining that a case is not moot when
the defendant came into compliance with the CWA after commencement of the
case. Id. ("The appellate court erred in concluding that a citizen suitor's claim for
civil penalties must be dismissed as moot when the defendant, albeit after com-
mencement of the litigation, has come into compliance."). In setting forth its
opinion in Laidlaw, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 263 (1967), which set forth
the standard for determining whether a defendant's voluntary conduct moots a
case. See generally id. The Court explained the standard by emphasizing that, "[a]
case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur." Id. at
189.
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In its Laidlaw opinion, the Supreme Court frequently noted
that compliance with the permit requirements or closure of the fa-
cility would render the case moot only if "one or the other of these
events made it absolutely clear that Laidlaw's permit violations
could not be reasonably expected to occur. 1 54 The Sixth Circuit
inappropriately applied Laidlaw to Ailor because the facts in Ailor
did not make it absolutely clear that the violations would not occur
again. 155 Thus, the court should not have ruled in favor of the City
unless it was absolutely certain that the City would not violate its per-
mit in the future. 156 If the Sixth Circuit had considered precedent,
it would have concluded that the issue in Ailor was not moot be-
cause the City failed to make it absolutely clear that it would not
continue violating its NPDES permit in the future. 157 By not doing
so, the court failed to appropriately apply precedent to the
record.158
The City did not make it absolutely clear that it would not con-
tinue to violate its NPDES permit.15 9 The Sixth Circuit tactfully
sidestepped confronting the City's violations in February, March
and May of 2001 by asserting that the City was in compliance with
the permit in November of 2001, when the City requested summary
judgment.160 The "'heavy burden of persuading' the court that the
challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up
again lies with the party asserting mootness."' 6' Thus, it was the City's
burden to prove that the issue was moot and that the City had com-
pletely discontinued violating its NPDES permit.162 The City failed
154. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 193 (citing Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968)) (emphasis added).
155. SeeAilor, 368 F.3d at 601-02 (Cole,J, dissenting) (stating that defendants
did not prove that violations would not occur again).
156. See id.
157. See id. In the Appellants' Brief, the Appellants noted, "[i]t is interesting
that the defendant continues to insist that it is in compliance with its NPDES per-
mit despite the fact that the defendant admits it was in violation after the plaintiffs
gave their statutorily-required pre-filing notice and even during the month in
which this action was commenced." See Brief of Appellant at 3; Ailor, 368 F.3d 587
(6th Cir. 2004).
158. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 601-02 (Cole, J., dissenting) (mentioning court's
failure to appropriately interpret record).
159. See id. at 602 (noting that City's period of compliance was fairly brief,
given the City's years of chronic violations).
160. See id. at 599-600 (determining that defendants established that City com-
plied with NPDES permit, at the time of summary judgment in November 2001).
161. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(stating whose burden it is to prove issue is not moot).
162. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 601-02 (Cole, J., dissenting) (noting City's burden).
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to meet this burden; therefore, the court improperly granted sum-
mary judgment to the City. 163
C. Did the Plaintiffs Have the Authority to Bring a Suit Against
the City of Maynardville Under the CWA?
The Sixth Circuit's 2000 holding in Jones is especially germane
to its subsequent opinion in Ailor.164 In Ailor, the Sixth Circuit
failed to address how it should interpret its previous holding in
Jones in light of the facts in Ailor.165 The court referenced Jones
twice in its opinion, but neither time did it grapple with how to
applyJones to the case at hand.166 In Jones, the Sixth Circuit empha-
sized that the citizen suit under the CWA was not precluded be-
cause the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board (TWQCB) and
the TDEC did not rise to the level of a federal or a state court, as is
specified under the CWA provisions noting the bars to citizen
sUits.167 In Ailor, the very same administrators, the TDEC and the
TWQCB, took actions against the City, yet the Sixth Circuit quickly
deemed Ailor's claim moot before even arriving at the analysis
under the CWA. 168 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Ailor, therefore,
loosely interpreted the Sixth Circuit's decision in Jones.169
163. See id. at 602 (maintaining that City failed to meet burden of proof).
164. See id. (noting that Sixth Circuit made it clear in Jones that approval from
state of Tennessee did not automatically bar private individuals from seeking to
enforce federal clean-water statutes).
165. See id. at 601-02 (lacking interpretation of its previous holding in Jones).
166. See id. at 590-91 (citing Jones for proposition that agency suits trump
CWA's citizen suit provision when they are initiated prior to the commencement
of citizen's suit, are diligently prosecuted and are brought in court of United States
or any state court). Id. at 594 (recognizing that district court claimedJones holding
did not preclude citizen suit under CWA in Ailor).
167. See Jones, 224 F.3d at 518-22 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that actions by
TDEC and TWQCB are not comparable to action in federal or state courts).
168. See Ailor, 368 F.3d at 599 (agreeing with district court's opinion that "it is
undisputed that the expansion of the treatment plant has remedied the overflow
problem, since there is no evidence that any overflow has occurred since Novem-
ber 2000."). In Ailor, it was the Commissioner of the TDEC who initially com-
menced an action against the City. Id. at 592. The Commissioner concluded that
the City had violated Tennessee Code § 69-3-108(b) (3) and (6) because the City
had discharged wastes in excess of what its NPDS permit allowed. Id. at 591.
Then, the TWQCB held meetings and hearings with the City in order to create an
Order penalizing the City and mandating that the City take certain corrective ac-
tions. See id.
169. See id. at 600-01 (distinguishing Laidlaw from Ailor). In Laidlaw, the de-
fendant Laidlaw bought a hazardous waste incinerator, which included a waste-
water treatment plant. 528 U.S. at 175 (describing facts of case). After Laidlaw
bought the plant, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC) granted Laidlaw a NPDES permit, which permitted Laidlaw to
discharge treated water into the North Tyger River. Id. at 175-76. Despite receiv-
ing its NPDES permit, Laidlaw repeatedly violated its permit by frequently exceed-
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VI. IMPACT
The impact of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Ailor by itself may
not be far-reaching. Nevertheless, if the circuit courts and the Su-
preme Court continue to set this high standard for citizen-plaintiffs
under the CWA, the number of citizen suits brought under the
CWA will likely diminish. 170 Since Congress has permitted citizen
suits under the CWA, the judiciary has more frequently used a
"skeptical eye" to decide the ability of citizens to bring suit. 171 This
skepticism towards private enforcement will undermine the func-
tion of citizen suits. 172 If the judiciary increasingly undermines citi-
zen suits under federal environmental laws, the citizen suit
provision will have no practical use.173 Furthermore, if the courts
continuously forbid citizen enforcement of environmental suits, cit-
izen suits will accomplish nothing and the environment will suffer
as a result.174 Because citizen suits arise from a concern for the
public welfare, they add strength that agency enforcement does
not.175
Jennifer Stratis
ing the permit's mercury limits. Id. at 179. Friends of the Earth ("FOE") sent a
letter to Laidlaw, giving sixty-day notice of FOE's intent to sue. Id. at 176. After
receiving notice from FOE, Laidlaw's lawyer contacted DHEC to ask DHEC if they
would file suit against FOE. Id.
170. See Richard Lazarus, Rise and Demise of the Citizen Suit, 15 ENVTL. FORUM 5,
at 8 (1998) (maintaining that number of citizen suits would likely diminish after
Laidlaw).
171. See THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, Citizen Suit, 20 ENVTL. FORUM 2,
at 3 (2003), available at http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:rqt8Ffbc8Ss:www.
tlpj .org/NewsPDF/hecker-profile.pdf+% 22citizen+suit% 22+and+effect&hl=en
("... [T] he judiciary has become more conservative, and more hostile to private
enforcement of public rights and public remedies associated with statutory causes
of action. A series of Supreme Court decisions has cast a skeptical eye toward such
private enforcement.").
172. See id. (claiming that courts enforcement will undermine citizen suits).
173. See Richard A. Smith, Citizen Suits Put Teeth in Clean Water Act, Aug. 21,
1997, http://www.djc.com/special/enviro97/10030780.htm (opining that citizen
suits help laws to mean what they say).
174. See Defenders of Wildlife, The Public in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Stat-
utes to Protect Biodiversity, Sept. 2000, available at http://www.defenders.org/states/
publications/publicinaction.pdf (maintaining that only public can ensure protec-
tion of the public interests).
175. See Eilperin, supra, note 1 (stating that enforcement is not a priority for
administration, which is doing little deter polluters from breaking the law).
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